eCoop open redirect and XSS on login page

Accepting unvalidated user-input in redirect URL-s can result in security issues

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eCoop, an Estonian food retailer, had two vulnerabilities on their login page. Both were responsibly disclosed and fixed by the vendor.

When unauthenticated users visit the online e-store and try to access a feature intended for authenticated users, they are shown a login page.

The URL of the login page ( has a query parameter next, which is intended for user convenience - you get redirected to the subpage you were trying to access after login.

However, the frontend code in charge of using this parameter didn’t validate the value, and it was possible to misuse it for two abuse cases.

The ?next= query parameter is an urlencoded value of an URI path in the same frontend application (React router path), with expected values like %2Fet%2Fostunimekirjad%2F (decoded: /et/ostunimekirjad/).

The application tries to redirect to this path after the “Login” button is pressed.

Open redirect

It was possible to feed a full URI value to the next parameter, hence redirecting the visitor out from the original eCoop website after they attempted a login. The frontend code did not validate that the passed value would be a subpage of the current site.

PoC: Phishing e-mail from “Coop” with a link to (// with two slashes - external (currently unclaimed) domain). Users would try to login on a legitimate site, but get redirected to a phishing site after the first login attempt.

Reflected XSS

It was also possible to abuse the next query parameter to execute JavaScript in the context of the site. This could be done, because it was possible to specify javascript as the link protocol.

PoC: (javascript:alert(1)). A maliciously crafted link could be sent to a user, with the payload encoded in the URL. The payload would execute once the victim pressed “log in”, and run arbitrary JavaScript in the context of the eCoop site.

eCoop session cookie is marked as httpOnly, but the site has no Content Security Policy in place to protect against it. The payload could include additional scripts, modify the content of the site, read out user-entered username/password, or phish for more information - all the while using the percieved legitimacy of the trusted domain/brand.

The fix

eCoop fixed the issue 16 months after initial disclosure. The fix involved adding a frontend validator for the value of the next parameter, checking it against a whitelist of all internally set React Routes.

// ...
return o(t, e), f(t, [{
    key: "componentWillMount",
    value: function() {
        if (this.props.location.query) {
            var e =;
            e && this.validateRedirectPath(e), this.props.location.query.e && this.setState({
                socialLoginErrors: (0, R.attachError)(null, this.props.location.query.e, this.context.activeLanguage)
    key: "validateRedirectPath",
    value: function(e) {
        var t = e.split("/"),
            r = this.whitelistedRedirectPaths.some(function(e) {
                var r = e.split("/");
                return r.length === t.length && r.every(function(e, r) {
                    var u = t[r];
                    return ":" === e[0] && u || e === u
        if (!r) throw "Invalid redirect path!"
    key: "_getWhitelistedRedirectPaths",
    value: function(e) {
        return e.reduce(function(e, t) {
            return e.concat(t.childRoutes.filter(function(e) {
            }).map(function(e) {
                return "/" +
        }, [])
// ...

The fix appears effective, as both PoC-s now fail.

Appendix: Timeline

  • 2019-04-04 Initial discovery
  • 2019-04-04 No security / IT contact (or responsible disclosure/security.txt) found for eCoop, wrote to customer support for an IT contact
  • 2019-04-05 Received contact e-mail of E-Services Development Manager
  • 2019-04-07 Responsible disclosure to Coop about both problems, with full PoC \ explanation
  • 2019-04-08 Acknowledgment of receipt from Coop’s E-Services Development Manager; PoC forwarded to development team
  • 2019-11-25 Escalation: disclosure to CERT-EE (CC Coop); as nothing had happened yet - bug still live. No response form either party
  • 2020-03-12 Escalation: contact Coop ISO directly for an update (CC original report contents)
  • 2020-03-12 ISO replies: acknowledgment that issue was known internally since initial report; remediation plan had been made (switch to a new technical e-store platform), but implementation delayed
  • 2020-08-04 ISO notifies that the issue has been fixed in the current production system
  • 2020-08-05 Verified fix (a whitelist validator had been added; protects against both PoC-s), can see no obvious bypass - issue fixed
  • 2020-08-05 Public disclosure

Appendix: developer view wrote a blog on this: Tackling Security Issues.

Appendix: Disclosure e-mail


Kirjutan Teile kui e-arendusjuhile heas usus, et responsible disclosure raames teada anda Coop e-poest leitud XSS + open redirect turvaveast. Teadaolevalt ei ole neid veel halvasti ära kasutatud, ning see teavitus võimaldab Teil vead parandada, muutes Coop keskkonna klientidele (sh minule) turvalisemaks.

(Kirjutan otse Teile, kuna ei suutnud kodulehelt leida turvaküsimusteks otsekontakti, ning ei kasuta security.txt standardit).

Leitud haavatavused on järgnevad.

Open redirect

Rakenduse aktsepteerib sisselogimisel URL parameetrit “next”. Näiteks, kui sisselogimata külastaja vajutab peamenüü lingile “Ostunimekirjad”, suunatakse ta edasi “Sisene eCoopi” lehele, kusjuures lehe URL on

Aadressi vaadates märgati, et next parameeter sisaldab URI segmenti ja on ilmselt haavatav open redirect turvaveale: next parameetri väärtus on muudetav ning võib näidata suvalisele URL-ile - mispeale rakendus ka peale sisselogimist sinna suunab.

PoC: (peale sisselogimist suunatakse ümber veebilehele)

Probleem: rakendus ei valideeri next parameetri väärtust ning suunab ka välistele domeenidele.

Väärkasutus (näide #1): Kliendile saadetakse link stiilis; näiteks phishing-uudiskirjaga. Kirjas olev link on õigele domeenile, ning klient usaldab seda. Peale sisselogimist suunab süsteem aga edasi phishing veebilehele, mis asub hoopis teisel domeenil, ning väidab, et sisselogimine ebaõnnestus, palun sisestada parool uuesti. Klient ei märka domeeni muutust, ning annab kolmandale osapoolele oma parooli.


Kriitilisus: Madal

Reflected XSS via GET URI

Kasutades sama next URL parameetrit sisselogimislehel, on võimalik ecoop keskkonnas käivitada JavaScript koodi. See on nn “Reflected XSS” haavatavus.

Probleem: Rakendus käivitab next parameetri väärtust kui JavaScript koodi, kasutaja browseri kontekstis - XSS

PoC: (peale sisselogimist suunatakse ümber teisele domeenile localhost, kusjuures kliendi parool on tekstina URL-is)

Väärkasutus (näide #1): Kliendile saadetakse phishing kirjaga link Coop e-poodi. Kirjas olev link on õigele domeenile, ning klient usaldab seda. Link viib sisselogimislehele. Kui klient vajutab “Logi sisse”, käivitub next parameetris olev JavaScript kood, mis võtab kliendi poolt täidetud parooli väljast (enne ümbersuunnamist!) parooli väärtuse, ning saadab selle kolmandale osapoolele, kompromiteerides nõnda kliendi sisselogimisandmed.


Kriitilisus: Keskmine

Palun vastust, kinnitamaks raporti kättesaamist ning võimalusel ka indikatiivset aega, millal mainitud vead parandatakse (tüüpiliselt parandatakse turvavead maksimaalselt 90 päeva jooksul).